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Empirical Assessments of Clinical Ethics Services: Implications 





The need to evaluate the performance of clinical ethics services is 
widely acknowledged, although work in this area is more developed 
in the United States. In the US many studies that assess clinical 
ethics services have utilised empirical methods and assessment 
criteria. The value of these approaches is thought to rest on their 
ability to measure the value of services in a demonstrable fashion. 
However, empirical measures tend to lack ethical content, making 
their contribution to developments in ethical governance unclear. 
The steady increase of clinical ethics committees in the UK must be 
accompanied by efforts to evaluate their performance. As part of this 
evaluative work it is important to examine how the practice of CECs 






Efforts to determine the value of clinical ethics services are often based on 
empirical methods and assessment criteria.1 These approaches can lack ethical 
content because of their focus on empirically measured outcomes.2, 3   As the 
numbers of clinical ethics committees (CECs) in the UK steadily increase, it is 
important that they are able to draw on an ethically informed account of the 
implications of these studies for their practice. This paper assesses a number 
of studies that focus on different empirical measures and identifies their 
ramifications for clinical ethics services in the UK. The studies were selected 
from a literature review as significant representatives of efforts to employ 
quantative measures to assess the work of ethics committees and consultants. 
The paper begins by articulating why it is important to assess ethics 
committees and identifies a number of obstacles to conducting such 
evaluative work.    
 
The Importance of Evaluation 
 
The need to assess the performance and contribution of CECs is supported by 
a number of factors. Firstly, evaluation is deemed important to help ensure 
that ethics services are transparent and accountable – as far as confidentiality 
requirements permit. As Craig and May have recently argued, ethics services 
‘… should be held accountable for their recommendations, and standards are 
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needed to judge the merit of the work any particular consultant [or 
committee] does.’2 Accountability is crucial to allow committees to win user 
confidence, without which services may be under used because they are not 
afforded sufficient importance or respect.  UNESCO has stated that if ‘… 
committees fail to address evaluation, the danger is that they will become 
institutionally isolated, lose credibility and forfeit long-term viability’.4 
 
Secondly, the importance of instituting some form of assessment of CECs 
arises from the need to justify affording them limited health resources – in 
terms of staff time and financial investment. To warrant such investment 
committees must demonstrate that they make a positive contribution to 
clinical care. As the Royal College of Physicians has emphasised: ‘… 
[j]ustifying adequate resourcing for ethics support nationally and locally 
requires evidence of effectiveness.’3, 5 Indeed, it would be ethically suspect to 
support a service that does not benefit clinical decision-making and patient 
care, or a service which proved harmful to patients. 
 
Thirdly, the evaluation of clinical ethics services may also be important in 
helping to improve their performance.6 As Van Allen et al. note, the 
information gained from assessments ‘… can then be used to plan future 
activities so as to achieve greater overall impact.’7 However, to date 
information on the benefits and disbenefits of clinical ethics committees is so 
scant that it should not be assumed that the best course would be to reform 
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the way a particular committee works. Rather, committees must also allow for 
the possibility that the assessment process could recommend their temporary 
or permanent dissolution, rather than ways to hone their performance.   
 
Obstacles to the Measurement of Performance 
 
Once committees accept the importance of testing their effectiveness, they will 
have to consider how best to conduct such work. UNESCO has noted that the 
assessment of ethics services tends to involve either ‘self’ or ‘external’ 
evaluation and can range from informal discussions, the use of internal or 
externally issued questionnaires and formal interviews.4 UNESCO suggests 
that self-evaluation is ‘rarely sufficient’ given the lack of objectivity it 
provides. External assessment is proposed as being more beneficial because it 
can help to ‘… identify strengths that can be maintained, weakness that 
should be corrected, policy considerations that have been overlooked…’4 
While external assessment is preferable, it will be more expensive and more 
difficult to conduct than internal evaluation. Thus, without some form of 
support – whether national or local - committees will struggle to balance the 
need to initiate evaluation with the limited resources that they have at their 
disposal.    
 
Indeed, the development and evaluation CECs in the UK risks being 
compromised by a lack of resources. This is partly because of the finite 
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resources within the NHS. But restrictions will also result from the failure to 
regard ethical governance – of which CECs are currently a central part – as a 
key feature of healthcare infrastructure. As Vetter has highlighted, clinical 
governance arrangements frequently do ‘… not include another important 
factor, ethics’.8 Similarly, literature on clinical ethics committees has pointed 
to the need to incorporate ethics within clinical governance arrangements and 
the lack of clarity that currently surrounds the relationship between CECs and 
clinical governance.9, 10 The failure to regard clinical ethics services as 
potentially important tools within the pursuit of clinical excellence will have a 
detrimental impact on the development of quality ethics services. This is 
because the services are unlikely to be standardised or assessed with any 
rigor if they are not regarded as important. Individuals and bodies interested 
in clinical excellence and ethical governance must work to overcome the 
inertia that prevents the formalised assessment of these committees.   
 
Efforts to gain the resources and commitment needed to make the assessment 
of CECs viable must emphasise that clinical governance initiatives that seek to 
build an evidence-base, or develop clinical guidelines to further the pursuit of 
excellence in clinical practice, 11 require ethical support. For example, the drive 
to identify optimal treatments will frequently be accompanied by questions 
over how such novel – and often expensive - therapies should, ethically, be 
distributed. Similarly, efforts within clinical governance to reduce risks to 
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patients and the wider community will repeatedly encounter ethical questions 
over how best to balance individual and public interests. In some cases the 
development of national ethics policy will help to resolve such tensions.12 
However, it will often be necessary to make ethical treatment decisions by 
assessing the details of particular cases at a local level.  In order to support 
such decision-making, sufficient resources must be made available. If CECs 
are to provide this support they will require assistance to prevent them from 
creating greater ethical calamities than they resolve. 
 
Another problem that confronts all endeavours to evaluate CECs is the need 
to find a yardstick or criterion against which to measure their work. Given the 
need to justify and support the use of ethics services within healthcare 
environments it is perhaps not surprising that empirical outcome measures 
tend to dominate this work. As Fox and Arnold contend: 
 
… outcomes research is essential for providing the worth of ethics 
consultation to the larger medical and public policy community. In this 
era of escalating healthcare costs, health planners, policy makers, and 
administrators are increasingly demanding that providers justify the 
resources they expend by demonstrating measurable results.13 
 
Studies conducted in the US – a jurisdiction more advanced than the UK in its 
development and assessment of clinical ethics services - have employed a 
variety of empirical markers to assess the value of ethics committees and 
ethics consultation services that operate in clinical care. Namely, whether: 
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service users are happy (satisfied) with the service they receive;14-17 the service 
has a positive impact on the withdrawal of unnecessary treatment;18-20 the 
volume (quantity) of work the service performs is sufficient.21 The 
development of CECs in the UK is following a similar pattern to the growth of 
Hospital Ethics Committees (HECs) in the US. The assessment of ethics 
services may, in time, also take a similar course. Thus, it is important that 
CECs in the UK consider at an early stage of their development how they can 
learn from and perhaps improve upon the efforts in the US to evaluate ethics 
services using such yardsticks. At the foundation of this work must be a 
through assessment of the benefits and disbenefits of quantitative empirical 
outcome measures.  
 
The Assessment of Empirical Measures 
 
User Satisfaction   
 
Amongst the most well known studies to utilise satisfaction to help determine 
the value of hospital-based ethics consultation services are the studies of La 
Puma et al.15, 22  These studies examine whether the physicians who requested 
an ethics consultation – using a physician-ethicist consultant rather than a 
committee – were satisfied with the results. The initial study identified the 
characteristics of the patients that were the subject of the consultation request, 
the reason(s) for the physician asking for the consultation and the level of 
physician satisfaction with the service.22  The report of the study details issues 
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such as the age of the patient, their location within the healthcare service and 
whether the patient was competent.  The reasons given for requesting the 
consultation include: withdrawal of treatment, resuscitation, autonomy and 
legal issues.22 The study found that 71% of physicians reported that the ethics 
consultation had been ‘very important’ in 36 treatment decisions that were 
part of the study.22 In 96% of cases the physicians said they would seek the 
help of the ethics consultant again if necessary.22 The second study conducted 
by La Puma et al. in the context of a community hospital also reports high 
physician satisfaction (86% of 70 respondents) with 97% reporting they would 
use an ethics consultation in the future.15 
 
One concern raised by these studies that should be considered by those 
staffing and developing CECs in the UK is whether it is ethically appropriate 
to rely on the satisfaction of physicians and healthcare professionals to 
determine what constitutes a successful service.  In this respect, Tulsky and 
Lo have highlighted that placing physicians at the heart of the ethics 
consultation process risks giving insufficient attention to the perspective of 
patients.23 In the US this issue was addressed by a number of later empirical 
studies that measured whether patients and their next of kin were happy with 
the service they received from a clinical ethics service. 16, 17 These studies assess 
levels of patient satisfaction by comparing it directly to the satisfaction levels 
of physicians.  
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In their comparison of attitudes in 20 case consultations - conducted by a 
three-person consult team - McClung et al. found that patients (71% response 
rate) were more likely to be dissatisfied than physicians (77% response rate) 
or nurses (77% response rate).16 They report an overall satisfaction rating of 
96% amongst physicians, 95% amongst nurses and 65% amongst patients or 
their families.16 In their retrospective study of 23 cases (adjusted from 40 
actual case consultations during the study period), Yen and Schneiderman 
also found a higher satisfaction level amongst medical staff than families.17 
The participation rate of families in the study was significantly lower than 
that of healthcare workers (17% compared to 66%).17 However, there was 
again a lower satisfaction level amongst families – although the results are 
based on interviews with only four families. That is, 90% of the medical staff 
said the ethics consultation was important and would recommend it to 
others.17 But of the four families who participated, two thought the ethics 
service was important in ‘… identifying and analysing ethical issues, 
educating the family, and increasing confidence in patient management’. 
However, two of these families and one additional family (three families in 
total) stated that they ‘strongly disagreed that the consultant was important in 
resolving ethics issues’.17 Hence, while the families thought the ethics service 
was of some use, most expressed concern over the ability of the service to 
actually resolve ethical dilemmas.  
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These studies suggest that by using the measure of satisfaction CECs can, 
with relative ease, initiate and sustain meaningful assessments of their 
performance. For example, service users could be asked to complete a simple 
questionnaire to record how happy they were with various aspects of the 
CEC’s work. Reports of high levels of satisfaction amongst service users could 
be cited to support resources being afforded to the committee and as evidence 
of service quality. If users report they are dissatisfied with the service 
provided by the committee, this would allow the CEC in question to identify 
flaws in their ways of working and could lead to the introduction of service 
improvement measures or, if the problems are severe, to the committee being 
disbanded. If, for example, dissatisfaction is expressed regarding the time 
dedicated to a consultation, or the breadth of expertise drawn upon, then 
changes can be made to rectify these concerns. Hence the satisfaction 
yardstick appears to offer clinical ethics services a cost effective and 
manageable way to measure their performance. 
 
However, CECs must utilise this measure with caution. Committees in the UK 
– and elsewhere - should take account of the concerns raised over the initial 
tendency in the US to rely solely on the opinions of physicians and healthcare 
professionals. Any drive to ethical quality within clinical care must 
incorporate the views of patients and their families to prevent a return to the 
culture of paternalism.  Indeed, this does not only suggest that the views of 
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patients should have a place in the assessment of CECs, but that the services 
of the committee should also be available to them. At this relatively early 
stage in their development, CECs in the UK should be forewarned about this 
issue to ensure that it is addressed by their processes, goals and evaluation 
efforts. 
 
An even greater limitation of the satisfaction yardstick is revealed by the 
discrepancy between the satisfaction levels of different user-groups; namely, 
its subjectivity. This means that it would be unreliable to equate satisfaction 
alone with service quality.13 This, for example, is because physicians could 
report they are satisfied with the advice offered by an ethics committee 
because it affirms their personal position, or because it offers a simple 
solution to a dilemma. Similarly, a patient’s close contacts may report that 
they are dissatisfied with the recommendation of a committee that life-
sustaining treatment should cease, even though withdrawing this futile 
treatment was ethically sound. At the very least, it is important that CECs 
appreciate the limitations of the satisfaction yardstick. If committees choose to 
incorporate this measure within their assessment initiatives, its limitations 
require that it be supplemented by other evaluation criteria. Thus, the 
potential of other empirical yardsticks must be assessed.  
 




The studies conducted by Schneiderman et al. within intensive care units 
combine the assessment of user satisfaction with the measurement of how 
ethics consultations impact on the provision of ‘non-beneficial treatment’ in 
cases where individuals do not survive to be released from hospital.18, 19 The 
team reported high levels of satisfaction in all groups.  However, the primary 
contribution made by Schneiderman et al. to debates on the evaluation of 
ethics consultation services is their contention that ethics services can lessen 
the provision of burdensome, non-beneficial treatment within an intensive 
care setting.  Studies that use this yardstick imply that it has the potential to 
help support claims that ethics services can both improve patient care and 
reduce the financial burden on service providers by restricting the amount of 
futile treatment provided.   
 
In their initial single site study Schneiderman et al. report that their use of a 
randomized control method found that mortality levels were the same in 
cases that received and did not receive ethics intervention (consultation). But 
the patients in the intervention group who died before they were discharged 
from hospital had spent less time in ICU and, therefore, were deemed to have 
received less unnecessary treatment, ‘most likely due to the withdrawal of 
life-prolonging treatment’.18 Hence on the basis of this information, 
Schneiderman et al. contend that ethics consultation can help in difficult 
clinical decisions.  
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In a second multi-site study Schneiderman et al. again report that the time 
spent in ICU on ventilation was reduced by three days amongst those who 
did not survive and who received an ethics intervention; of the patients who 
were discharged from hospital, no difference in time spent in ICU was 
identified between the control and intervention groups.19 Hence they state that 
‘… fears that ethics consultations would simply provide a subterfuge for 
“pulling the plug” were not borne out’ because there was ‘no significant 
difference’ in the mortality rates of the intervention or control group.19 In his 
editorial comments on this study Lo draws attention to the fact that:  
… the intervention group had a slightly higher mortality rate (62.7% vs 
57.8%). Although this difference was not statistically significant, it may 
nonetheless be clinically and ethically meaningful.24 
 
As this suggests, it is impossible to determine whether the statistical evidence 
provided by Schneiderman et al. to support the hypothesis that ethics 
consultation can reduce non-beneficial treatment, actually represents good 
ethical work. The report of the study fails to provide any ethical analysis to 
show that the patients in the intervention group who died should, ethically, 
have been allowed to die. This highlights the difficultly of identifying ‘good’ 
ethical outcomes by appealing to statistical accounts of performance. Those 
involved with establishing or running CECs in the UK may be encouraged by 
claims that they can help to reduce unnecessary treatment.  However, it is 
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important that institutions establishing CECs, committee members and those 
developing ways to assess the performance of committees grasp the 




Another empirical measure that has been utilised in the assessment of clinical 
ethics committees is quantity.21, 25 Scheirton reports that in the study she 
conducted in Minnesota between 1989 and 1990:  
 
Success was defined in terms of the number of interventions 
undertaken by the committees in four functional areas: Education, 
guidelines development, prospective and retrospective case review.21 
 
Thus, while many studies of ethics services have tended to focus on assessing 
only ethics consultation services – one aspect of the educational, policy and 
case consultation tasks performed by CECs - Sheirton’s work highlights the 
importance of incorporating policy and educational initiatives within 
assessments. The survey was based on the responses of 125 committee chairs 
to a questionnaire that probed the work of committees in these four areas.25  In 
respect of education, the survey asked questions regarding the type of 
educational initiatives the committee engaged in (e.g. workshops, seminars, 
in-service training).  Based on the response of each chair, Scheirton explains: 
 
… all educational interventions conducted were added up, yielding a 
new variable, sum of educational interventions, which range between 0 
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Similar quantitative assessments were also conducted in respect of the policy 
work and prospective and retrospective case consultations performed by 
committees. Scheirton claims that ‘composite measures of objective success 
were created…’ by adding together the results from the four areas surveyed.   
For example, a new measure of ‘multifunctionality’ was created.25 Its aim was 
to illustrate the success of a committee across all the tasks they conduct. 
Scheirton acknowledges that a weakness of this measure is that it does not 
allow for the fact that a committee might be very successful at one task (e.g. 
policy work) and ineffective at another (e.g. prospective consultations).25 
 
The quantity measure used within the study may be attractive to those 
involved with CECs because it appears to provide the type of outcome based 
justification typically required by management. However, the quantity of 
tasks performed by an ethics service should not be taken to illustrate service 
quality or good ethics. This, for example, is because a small number of tasks 
being conducted may well signify that the committee is deadwood within the 
institution. If this is the case, the existence of the committee (in name only) 
will suggest that there is a resource available for responding to ethical issues 
that does not really exist. Similarly, a committee could perform a large 
number of tasks due to its slapdash approach, or because it merely rubber 
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stamps the opinions of clinicians and gives insufficient time to the opinions of 
patients and their families.5 However, a committee that only produces advice 
on a small number of cases over many years may be exacting and produce 
work that is ethically rigorous and a committee with a high workload may 
accomplish so much because of its excellent procedures and high levels of 
ethics training.26 Thus, it would be unwise for committee members or 
managers to measure the worth of a committee based on the number of tasks 
it performs.  
 
Conclusion: Preconditions for the Assessment of CECs  
 
The existence of ethics services in health care institutions will lead those who 
use them to assume a certain degree of quality. Ways must be found of 
justifying this confidence. This paper has argued that an important step in this 
quest is the need for CECs to exercise caution over the illusory benefits that 
may be conferred on them by the quantative empirical measures that have 
been examined. This means that it is necessary to cultivate alternative ways of 
evaluating ethics services. Currently this endeavour encounters a variety of 
challenges. To create an environment in which assessment work can advance 
more easily a number of preconditions must be fulfilled.  
 
Precondition One: Commitment to Clinical Ethical Governance 
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In the UK clinical governance arrangements aim to produce excellent care by 
developing and implementing national clinical standards.27 Ethical issues have 
not received substantial attention within the clinical governance agenda.  
Indeed, ethics services are arranged on an ad hoc basis. Yet work on topics like 
consent and the appropriate distribution of resources illustrates the integral 
relationship between ethics and good clinical care.28, 29 The failure to integrate 
ethics within clinical governance can have negative implications for the 
quality of health care delivery, so undermining the whole clinical governance 
quest. Consigning ethics to the margins of clinical governance means that 
ethics services are not afforded the time or resources that are required to raise 
standards and develop assessment strategies. However, incorporating a 
discipline that cannot easily be measured within the intensely audited field of 
governance will be a challenge. To aid this process work is required to clarify 
the nature of ethics and its role in clinical governance (Precondition Two). In 
addition, extensive debate must be conducted on the best ways to generate 
and manage ethics services in clinical care (Precondition Four). 
 
Precondition Two: Realistic Expectations of Ethics and its Assessment 
 
Efforts to cultivate appropriate assessment strategies will need to adopt a 
more realistic approach regarding the precision that can be expected from 
efforts to demonstrate the value of ethics services. That is, rather than being 
led by the strict verification requirements of science or clinical care, work to 
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assess clinical ethics arrangements must accept that the quality of value 
judgements is less attestable than the worth of their clinical counterparts. For 
example, in the field of research governance the point has been made that 
failure to produce consistency in the decisions of different committees, does 
necessarily represent a failure of ethics.26 It is crucial that acknowledging this 
difference does not lessen the importance or relevance of ethics. This will 
require creating a greater appreciation of the role and limitations of ethics in 
health care.   
 
Precondition Three: Comprehensive Ethics Training 
 
 
It is necessary CEC members have a detailed knowledge of the nature of 
ethics. This is important for assessment because CEC members will have a 
significant role to play in the development and evaluation of ethics services.  
This is because without significant developments in clinical governance, CECs 
will be responsible for finding ways to make their service accountable. But 
even within a more formal approach to clinical ethical governance, 
committees must be involved in the generation of assessment initiatives to 
maximise the chance of any resulting strategy having support and being 
utilised by committees. Thus, committee members must be equipped to 
identify and implement procedures and strategies that are able to ensure their 
services are accountable and trustworthy. Ethics training will also facilitate 
the practical ethical skills required by their decision-making, policy formation 
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and educational responsibilities. Given this requirement it is of concern that 
studies in the US and the UK reveal that ethics specialists form a small 
percentage of members of clinical ethics committees.30-33  It is unrealistic to 
assume that the training required can be provided, as is currently the case, 
over a weekend or during an ‘intensive’ week-long course.34 However, unless 
Precondition One is fulfilled it is unlikely that efforts will be made to establish 
sufficient training programmes. A failure to provide appropriate training will 
leave many committee members to assume that ethics can be usefully 
assessed by empirical outcome measures and unaware of the need to find 
more suitable approaches.  
 
Precondition Four:  Debate on the Value of Formal and Informal Governance 
 
Some form of governance of clinical ethics services is required to help identify 
and maintain strategies that can, in the very least, help to protect the interests 
of patients. It is hoped that adopting a more formal approach to clinical 
ethical governance will also help to secure the time and resources needed to 
develop assessment methods. However, debate is required amongst all 
stakeholders to determine how best to balance the benefits and disbenefits of 
formal and informal clinical ethical governance. 
 
Clinical Ethics services in the UK are arranged on an ad hoc basis. The Clinical 
Ethics Network currently fosters exchange between existing CECs and 
provides short educational programmes.35 But in this system ethics education 
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is optional for CEC members, not a requirement. The Network has not sought 
to act as a vehicle to generate national standards or operational procedures for 
committees.35 Those involved in establishing the Network have acknowledged 
that committees require evaluation.10 But the Network itself has not taken a 
lead in devising the strategies required to initiate evaluation. These 
shortcomings support the need to adopt a more formal approach to the 
development and assessment of ethics services. However, the value of 
applying formal governance arrangements to ethics has been questioned.   
 
In the UK there have been a number of calls to ‘institutionalize’ or formally 
regulate (perhaps with legal force) CECs.36, 37 Doyal has warned of the ‘… 
double standard where rigorous regulation of clinical activity is confined only 
to research’.37 This comparison between existing research governance 
arrangements and plans to develop a broadly similar approach to clinical 
ethics encounters difficulties. This is because work on research governance 
has questioned whether formalising ethical governance in this field has 
helped research ethics committees and the pursuit of ethical quality.38 For 
example, it has been argued that formal governance arrangements that seek to 
produce consistency in the decisions of different committees are both 
unsuccessful and misguided.39, 40 Similarly, it has been claimed that strict, 
centralised governance can overlook the diversity of different committees and 
the legitimate moral pluralism to which this can lead.26 
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The deficiencies of the strict, ‘top-down’ research governance system point to 
the problems that can be created when ethics assessment fails to take 
sufficient account of the nature of value judgements. Initiatives to develop 
ethical governance arrangements in clinical care must learn from these 
concerns and similar lessons drawn from the criticism of empirical outcome 
measures. The participation of all stakeholders in the formulation of the 
framework for clinical ethics governance can help to ensure that governance 
arrangements needed not be devoid of the flexibility. However, it remains 
important that the clinical ethics community make the identification and 
maintenance of standards in the work of ethics services a priority.  Without 
such standards the value of their work will remain doubtful, as a result the 
interests of (vulnerable) patients may be undermined rather than protected.  
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